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Curve Finance Loses $38,200 in DAO Fees to Forged Orders

November 18, 2026 4 min readBy Bitcoin World
Curve Finance Loses $38,200 in DAO Fees to Forged Orders

BitcoinWorld Curve Finance Loses $38,200 in DAO Fees to Forged Orders Curve Finance has disclosed that an attacker took roughly $38,200 in accumulated DAO revenue on November 10 by pushing 138 forged trading orders through its Ethereum fee conversion contract, according to Crypto. news. The protocol said the flaw sat in the CowSwapBurner, the contract that sells collected fee tokens for crvUSD, and that no user deposits, lending markets or crvUSD holdings were involved.

An attacker stole about $38,200 from Curve Finance’s CowSwapBurner contract on November 10, 2026 by exploiting a signature verification flaw that let 138 unauthorized orders pass as valid. Curve says only accumulated DAO fee revenue was taken and user funds were untouched. Key facts The attacker stole approximately $38,205.

76 in USDC through 138 forged orders on November 10, while Curve’s own fee sales brought in 97,317. 74 crvUSD from 36 legitimate orders. The first fraudulent trade settled at 00:07 UTC, seven minutes after the weekly trading window opened; the last came at 11:10 UTC.

Within four hours, 37,611. 76 USDC was swapped for ETH, split across four addresses and bridged to Arbitrum, with about 37,229. 89 USDC reaching Hyperliquid and converted to 65.

41 XMR1. After an external vulnerability report on November 10, Curve’s Emergency DAO shut down fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC, then on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC. A governance proposal to replace the burner with a descending-price auction opened November 13 and was scheduled to close November 20.

Where the CowSwapBurner check broke down The weakness was in the contract’s isValidSignature function, which approves orders submitted through CoW Protocol. Curve said the function confirmed that the order described in the signature data met its rules — selling tokens for crvUSD, sending proceeds to the FeeCollector and receiving at least 500 crvUSD — but never checked that the description matched the order actually being executed. Because the contract ignored the order hash supplied by CoW Protocol, the attacker could pair the details of a legitimate order with an entirely different transaction.

With CoW Protocol already holding unlimited allowances to spend the burner’s tokens, forged orders could be submitted and their proceeds redirected whenever the trading window was open. The first one sold the burner’s YB balance for USDC straight to the attacker’s wallet, and the same legitimate order description then authorized 137 more trades involving other tokens. Curve reviewed all 6,558 orders settled through the burner since its June 2024 deployment.

The 138 unauthorized transactions were the only ones whose proceeds did not reach the FeeCollector. Most of the targeted balances had never sold because they fell under the 500 crvUSD minimum; the median fraudulent order was worth about $254 and only two cleared $500, and among previously traded tokens the median gap since the last sale was 161 days. The trail ends in Monero-linked assets The stolen funds were moved quickly.

Crypto. news reported that the balance held on Hyperliquid had not moved as of November 16. On November 15, the attacker turned the remaining 594 USDC into ETH and deposited 0.

3 ETH into Tornado Cash. On November 17, the Emergency DAO returned leftover token balances from the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum to their respective FeeCollector contracts. Curve has dealt with separate incidents elsewhere in its stack, including a domain hijack in May 2025 and a LlamaLend security incident in March 2026.

Neither, the protocol said, involved the fee conversion vulnerability disclosed in November. Why it matters For a DeFi protocol, accumulated fees are a soft target: they sit in a contract that grants spending permissions to an external venue, so a single unchecked approval path can leak revenue even when user collateral is isolated and safe. Curve’s review covering more than two years of burner activity suggests the design worked as intended until this signature check failed.

The timing also lands in a weak market, as our earlier reporting on Maple Finance’s asset targets shows how closely DeFi operators are watched on treasury and revenue discipline right now. Stolen fee revenue is small in dollar terms but bites directly into what a DAO can distribute. What to watch The vote on the replacement descending-price auction system, which verifies the actual order hash, closes on November 20.

Until it passes and a new burner is live, Ethereum fee conversion stays paused while fees pile up in the FeeCollector. Frequently Asked Questions Did the Curve Finance exploit affect user funds? No.

Curve said the attacker targeted administrative fee balances the protocol had already collected, and no user deposits, lending markets or crvUSD holdings were touched. How did the forged orders get past Curve’s signature check? The isValidSignature function checked the order description in the signature data but not the order hash supplied by CoW Protocol, so details from a legitimate order could be attached to a different transaction.

Where did the stolen funds go? Most were swapped into ETH, bridged to Arbitrum and sent to Hyperliquid for 65. 41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset, while 0.

3 ETH of the remainder went to Tornado Cash. Is Curve’s fee conversion running again? Ethereum fee conversion stayed paused while fees accumulate, and a governance vote on a replacement descending-price auction system was open until November 20.

This post Curve Finance Loses $38,200 in DAO Fees to Forged Orders first appeared on BitcoinWorld.